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NOTES.
LAW SCHOL-THE ORDER OF THE COIF-ELECTIONs-The

Pennsylvania Chapter of The Order of the Coif held its annual

meeting on Friday, April 9, 1915. The meeting was called to elect

officers for the present year, and to choose members from the Class
of 1915. The officers elected are William A. Schnader, Esq., Presi-

dent; H. Harrison Smith, Esq., Vice-President; L. P. Scott, Esq.,

Secretary and Treasurer. The new miembers chosen from the Class
of 19x5 are Robert M. Gilkey, Earle Hepburn, Alvin L. Levi, Edward W. Madeira and Thomas Reath, Jr. It is probable that some
additional members will be selected when the results of the final
examinations become known.'
CARRIER'S LIEN-STOPPAGE IN TRAkNSITU-THE COMMERCIAL

CouRT-An -interesting illustration of the spirit in which cases in
'For the complete list of members of THE ORDER OF THE Coi previous
&
to this election, see 6" Umv. oF PA. LAw REv. 629.
(665)
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the Commercial List,' in the King's Bench Division of the English
High Court, are decided is afforded by a decision of Mr. Justice
Pickford, which was recently reversed in the Court of Appeal.2 A
vendor, through his agent, entrusted to a carrier for delivery to the
purchaser a quantity of steel, and prepaid the carriage. One of the
conditions printed in the carrier's contract was a very usual one, in
the following terms:
"All goods delivered to the company will be received'and
held by them subject to a lien for money due to them for the
carriage of and other charges upon such goods and also to a
general lien for any other moneys due to them from the owners
of such goods upon any account."
The purchaser became ingolvent before delivery of the steel, so the
vendor exercised his right of stoppage in transitu and demanded the

return of the steel from the carrier. The carrier, however, set up
that there was a sum of money owing to it by the consignee on other
accounts, which, though they had nothing to do with this shipment
or this vendor, were covered by the contractual lien created upon
the goods, and refused to return the steel. The shipper, to obtain
release of the steel, paid the imount claimed to be due from the
consignee to the carrier, and then sued the carrier to recover the
amount so paid.
The question was thus clearly raised whether or not such a
clause in a bill of lading must be so interpreted as to subject a shipper who stops goods in translin, to liability for a debt of his insolvent vendee, with which he has nothing to do and of which he can
have no prior knowledge. Mr. Justice Pickford, in givinfg judgment
against the carrier, said:
"It is fairly obvious that the condition when framed was
not framed with the present- sort of case in view. It was
framed for the purpose of extending the particular lien which
would exist in respect of the carriage of any lot of goods to a
general lien in respect of all charges owing from the person
who was g6ing to receive those goods, and what was contemplated was that the carrier should not be bound to deliver to
'The Commercial List is a separate list of causes, created in 1895, in
which actions of a commercial nature may be entered by the leave of the
judge presiding over it, and to which one judge selected for the purpose
confines his entire attention so that it is never in arrears. The room in which
the List is heard is usually referred to, informally, as the Commercial Court.
For an outline of its history and practice see Theobald Mathew: Practice of
the Commercial Court (London, 19m2); and Studies in English Civil Procedure. 63 UNIV. oF PA. LAw Rav. 380o, at page 418 ff. (March, z915).
'United States Steel Products Co. v. Great 'Western Railway Co., 11913]
3 K. B. 357, before Mr. Justice Pickford. In the Court of Appeal, [954]
3 K. B. 567.

'At page 365.
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that person unless that person had satisfied the general lien
and paid his general account as well as the particular charges
upon the particular lot of goods. I do not say for a moment
that the words of the condition are not large enough to extend
considerably beyond that, but I 'think that the clause may be
and ought to be held to be satisfied by extending it no further
than that, and by reading it, as it quite well can be read, as
meaning that the goods shall be held by the company, and the
company shall not be bound to deliver them to the consignee
until he, the consignee, has discharged the debt that is due in
respect of all goods which have been carded for him by the
carrier. That is quite a possible and fair reading of the condition, and it is not necessary that it should be read as meaning
that the company should be entitled to hold as against persons
who have nothing to do with the debt!'
These words illustrate admirably the manner in which the custodian
of the Commercial List, specializing, as he does, for the time being,
in commercial causes, is able to get the point of view of the business
community and to interpret the terms of a contract so as to make
them mean what they are generally understood to mean by the per-,
sons who habitually use them.
The decision was, however, reversed by a somewhat impromptu
Court of Appeal,' who decided that the contract must be literally
construed and enforced in its apparent meaning, without any limitation and without any reference to the intent with which the clause
was framed. Lord Justice Kennedy said that he looked at the contract "apart altogether from the purpose, which is a dangerous
guide",5 and Mr. Justice Bray, saying, "There is a clear contract",*
could nrot even see room for a difference of opinion, so they refused
to ratify the limitation put upon it by the Commercial Court. That
is the abstract barrister's point of view, as. opposed to the business
man's, and it explains the reasons for the setting up of a Commercial
List separate from the ordinary list of King's Bench actions.
It is worth while to note here that twenty-five years earlier two
American' Supreme Courts came, independently, to a conclusion
identical with that of Mr. Justice Pickford, but neither decision was
cited either in the Commercial Court or in the Court of Appeal. The
first was a Pennsylvania case which arose out of a very similar contract7 There the disputed clause in the bill of lading read:
'Lord Sumner was called from the House of Lords and Mr. Justice Bray
from the King's Bench Division to constitute, with Lord Justice Kennedy,
a third Court of Appeal, at the end of Hilary Term, x9x4, because of the
arrears in that branch of the Supreme Court.

'At page 58r.
'At page ;86.
'Pennsylvania R. IP Co. v. American Oil Works, Ltd., x26 Pa. 485 (1889).
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"Said merchandise may be retained for all arrearages of
freight and charges due thereon and also on any other goods by
the same consignee or owner,"
and the carrier claimed by virtue of this clause to retain the goods,
after a stoppage in transitu, for a general balance left unpaid by the
insolvent consignee. Judge Finletter, giving judgment in favor of
the vendor, indicated his views on the question of construction of
such contracts, as follows:
"If it be conceded that a common carrier can affect the
shipper with special contracts, by simply printing them upon
the bills of lading, it cannot well be questioned that such contracts are to a certain sense compulsory. The shipper is not in
a condition to dispute the terms; to do so would result in delay
and perhaps litigation. In this event, ordinary trade and commerce would suffer. The least that ought to be done, under
such an involuntary contract, would be to give the consignor
upon whom it is imposed the benefit of a most liberal construction, and hold the common, carrier to the converse."
On this principle, which conforms to the generally accepted rule
that when the terms of a contract have been drawn by one of the
parties they ought to be construed strictly against him, the court
held that the clause was aimed not at the shipper, but solely at the
consignee, and that interpretation was affirmed on appeal. It is
rather a coincidence that in the English case the steel was shipped
from Philadelphia. In North Carolina a similar conclusion was
reached upon the following words in a bill of lading:
"the several carriers shall have a lien upon the goods for
all arrearagesof freight and charges due by the same owners
or consignees on other goods."
The court said:'
"The commercial world- would doubtless be surprised if
it were understood that whenever such a stipulation was imposed upon consignors they were in effect yielding up their
lien for the purchase money, and substantially pledging their
goods for the payment of an existing indebtedness due their
agent, the carrier, by a possibly insolvent vendee."

An earlier English case, Wright v. Snell,' is very similar to
United States Steel Products Company v. Great Western Railway
Company. There the shipper, after having received from the carrier a notice that goods would be accepted only subject to a general
lien "for any general balance from their respective owners," deliv*Farrell v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., io2 N. C. 39o (1889).
•Barnewall & Alderson, 35o (K. B. x822).

NOTES

ered to the carrier goods to be conveyed to the shipper's own factor. Title, therefore, never passed out of the shipper. The carrier sought to hold the goods for a general balance owing by the
factor .on other accounts, but it was held that the carrier could not
subject A's goods to B's debt and must deliver back the goods upon
the demand of A. The difference in the cases is, of course, that the
exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu does not revest the title
in the vendor. But it does revest in him the right to take possession,
which is, after all, the only. right contested by the carrier's claim of
lien. There ought, therefore, to be no distinction, as between shipper and carrier, between'a case where title never passes from the
shipper, and one where, though title has passed, the right to take possession has revested.
As far back as i8o2 it was held by the Common Pleas, in Oppenheim v. Russel,'0 that a carrier could not set up either a custom
of the trade or even a contract with the consignee, giving the carrier
a general lien against the consignee, to defeat the vendor's right to
stop goods in transitu and retake them, and that decision was referred to with approval by Lord Ellenborotigh" and by Chief Justice Tindal. 2 If, therefore, the view of Mr. Justice Pikford and
the American cases be the true one-that the present contract is at
most an- agreement that the carrier should have a general lien
against the consignee-then Oppenheim v. Russel is a further
reason for declaring the right of the vendor superior to any carrier's
lien, once the freight on the particular shipment is paid.
But here a cu.rious question arises. In these cases of stoppage
in transitu title to the goods passes to the purchaser-consignee upon
their delivery to the carrier. Can a shipper make a contract with a
carrier which will bestow upon the carrier rights against a third
party, the consignee, who is no party to the contract? One can
hardly conceive an affirmative answer to such a question. That
difficulty was, in fact, stated by Colam, K. C., in his argument in the
Commercial Court.-1 Lord Sumner, in the Court of Appeal, was
strongly influenced by it. The reasoning of his opinion seems to
be:14 the shipper cannot confer upon the carrier a lien over another's goods so as to bind that other; therefore the shipper must
mean by his contract to bind himself. So here is a case where,
because the contract intended by the parties (assuming Mr. Justice
Pickford's statement of the intent to be correct) is one beyond their
power to make, the court will erect upon their words a contract different from the one they intended and far broader than any shipper
would, one feels certain, voluntarily enter into. It is horn-book law
3 Bosanquet & Puller, 42 (C. P. x8oz).
Smith v. Goss, 1 Campbell, 28 (C. P. z8o8).
"Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bingham's New Cases, 99 (C. P. 1836).
"[913] 3 K. B. at page 361.
u [1914] 3 K. B. at page 579.
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that the consignor is primarily liable for payment of freight on every
shipment and it is submitted that the only right he can confer on the
carrier by way of ageneral lien is a right to retain goods in just such
a case as this for the payment of an unpaid balance owing from him,
the consignor, but not from the consignee.
There is, indeed, a dictum from Michigan, by no less an authority than Judge Cooley, to the effect that the-consignor, in making a
contract of carriage with the carrier, has a1 presumed authority to
act as agent for and to bind the consignee. ' That was said in his
judgment in an action which arose out of the destruction by fire of
goods in warehouse at the terminus of transit. The company, being
sued by the consignee, sought to deny liability by virtue of a clause
in the contract with the shipper exempting the carrier from such
liability. But it is important to note that all the goods had been paid
for by the consignee before their delivery to the carrier for transit.
Where the vendor-consignor has been paid and has parted with all
interest in the goods before he delivers them to the carrier, it may be
considered that he acts as agent for the new owner in shipping the
goods. But even there it may be doubted if such a presumed authority would be held to extend so far as to cover the creation of a general lien against the principal, in view of the settled hostility of the
law to general liens.
We must wait for a case in which a carrier seeks to enforce
against the consignee a general lien which has. been thus "created"
by a contract with a third party; to have it judicially considered
whether or not such a contract is of any avail even against the consignee. But in the meantime, it is a matter of fact on which the teAtimony of the English business world would be of interest whether
the view of shippers as to the meaning of this disputed clause agrees
with that of Mr. Justice Pickford or with that of the Court of Appeal-whether it is understood by them to bind their own -rights or
those of consignees.
S.R.
CONFLICT OF LAws-TORTs---"LoRD CAMPBELL's

Acr"-Where

a cause of action, which arose in a foreign jurisdiction, is sought to
be enforced elsewhere, the law of the place where the cause of action
arose, the lex loci delicti, will determine the substantive rights of the
parties, while the lex fori will govern questions of remedy, such as
statute of limitations.' But where a new right of action, unknown
to the common law, has been created by statute and the statute which
gives the right at the same time provides the remedy for violation of
that right, those matters ordinarily pertaining to the remedy become
"McMillan et al. v. R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79 (j867), at page iig.
'Johnson v. R. R., So Fed. .!ep. 886 0892); Carson v. Smith, 133 Mo.
6c6 (i8qs).
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limitations to the substantive right and hence are determined by the
lex loci delicti, which governs all matters of substantive right.2 The
most importanf right of this nature, unknown to the common law,

but created by statute, is the action for wrongful death authorized
by Lord Campbell's Act s in England and by various adaptations of
that act in practically every State in the Union.'
The enforceability of rights gained under such a statute in a
jurisdiction other than the one in which the right was gained and the
cause of action created has never been doubted.' There are many
dicta to the effect that the forum must have a statute similar to'the
one under which the cause of action arose,' but it is not necessary
that the statutes be identical.! It has been contended that the necessity for similarity is not intended to introduce a new element into the
enforcement of action in tort committed elsewhere, but that similarity of statutes shows that enforcement of the foreign statute is not
contrary to the settled public policy of the forum and that such similarity makes it possible for the courts of the forum to have proper
machinery to enforce such a right.' From this willingness on the
part of the courts of a particular forum to give effect to foreign
statutes, dissimilar in a greater or less degrees to statutes of the
forum on the same subject, inevitably resulted problems of conflicts
of the laws of theseveral jurisdictions.
In'an action for wrongful death, no cause of action can accrue
to anyone except those given that right by the statute of the place
where occurred the wrongful act causing death; hence no question
arises as to whether the ultimate beneficiaries under the statute of
the fort.m can maintain an action, if they are not given such right
by the foreign statute. The*question which does arise is whether,
the party entitled to sue being a nominal party, trustee for the real
beneficiaries, who are the same in both jurisdictions, such party shall
be the one entitled by the lex fori or the lex loci delicti. It has never
been denied and has often been asserted that action by the person
'The Harrisburg, zi9 U. S. igg (1886) ; Bond v. Penna. . I. z24 Mina.

19S (1914).
*9& zo Vict, c.93 (1846).

'In Penna. Acts April zS, i85r, P. L 674, and April 26, i855, P. L 39.
6'Knight v. West Jersey R. It,o8 Pa. 250 (x88s); Anderson v. Louis-

Ville Ry. Co., 210 Fed. Rep. 689 (1914).
(189o).
9 Wooden v. R. R,
U. S. 120 (19o4).
'Dennick v. R.

Mass. 176 (892).

z26

N. Y.

1o

R., 103 U. S. i

But see Ash v. R. R, 72 Md.

x44

(8.i); Slater v. Mexican R. R. Co., 194

(1891) ; Higgins v.C. N.

. P. H., 155

*

'Wooden v. R. R., supra, note 6; Higgins v. C. N. E. R. R.. supra, note 7,

"Ifforeign law penal, or offends our own policy, or repugnant to justice or
good morals, or calculated to injure this state or its citizens, or if no jurisdiction of parties who must be brought in to give a satisfactory remedy, or
if under our forms of procedure an action here cannot give a substantial

remedy, cour is are at liberty to decline jurisdiction."
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named in the foreign statute is proper*.and, strong dicta say, necessary. 0 These dicta had been accepted as final until the case of
Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad"' decided that, the real beneficiaries being the same, the nominal plaintiff might be the one named
in the statute of the forum, because, since these statutes" merely
removed a common law obstacle to recovery for a recognized tort,
and did not create a new cause of action, matters of remedy were
still to be determined by the lex foi. The value of that case must
be greatly lessened unless its results can be justified on other
grounds, for there is a decided weight of opinion that these statutes
create a new right of action, altogether unknown to the common
law.12 Before and. since the Stewart case, it has been generally held
that where right of action is given by both statutes to the administrator, the administrator appointed in the forunt is a proper party to
bring action,"' but these cases went rather to the powers of an administrator over choses in action of the deceased which arose in a
foreign jurisdiction, than to the question as to proper parties plaintiff to an action for wrongful death. The proper limits within which
procedure of the forum may be invoked in enforcing statutes for
wrongful death seem to have been set in Teti v. Consolidated Coal
Company," which contains an interpretation of Stewart v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad.Company"s which, if adopted by the court that decided that case, will relieve the Stewart case of its most objectionable
features. The Teti case divides this-class of actions into two subdivisions, those where the right to maintain the action is given directly to
'Wooden v. R. R., upra, note 6; Strait v. Yazoo & X. V. R. R, 2o9 Fed.
"Usher v. R. R., 126 Pa. 206 (1889); Lower v. Segal, 59 N. J. L. 66

Rep. 157 (1913).

(1896).
U168 U. S. 445 (1897). Action was here brought in the District of
Columbia by the administrator there appointed of the deceased, who was
killed in Maryland, by whose statute action must be brought in the name
of the state to the use of the same persons beneficially entitled under the
District of Columbia statute, which makes the administrator the proper party
plaintiff. Directly contra to this case on almost identical facts, see Stone v.
Groton Bridge Co., 77 Hun, 99 (N. Y. 1890).
2Ash
v. B. & 0. R. R, 72 Md. 144 (i89o) ; Ohneavage v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 259 II. 424 (1913) ; In re Brennan's Account, i6o App. Div. 401 (N. Y.
1914); Centofanti v. Penna.

"Bruce v. R. R., 83 Ky.

. R, 244 Pa. 255 (i924).
174

1'217 Fed. Rep. 443 (1914).

(i88s) ; Higgins v. R. R, supra, note 7.
Action brought in New York by adminis-

trators there appointed for death in Pennsylvania of Teti and Dastoli, the
former having left a widow and children, the latter a father and mother.
By the Pennsylvania acts, the widow must bring action for herself and
children, but parents of deceased sue in their own right. Held: The administrator of Teti is a proper party plaintiff, for by the New York statute,
administrator recovers also as trustee for widow and children. But the
administrator of Dastoli has no right of action, that being vested in the
parents of Dastoli.
"Supra, note IT.
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the one entitled in his or her own right to the recovery when had, and
those where the party entitled to and does so in a representative capacity. The Stewart case is held to apply to the second class only,
and, while it is admitted that there may be technical objections to
applying the le.r fort in such a case, the infinitely greater convenience
in allowing the trustee entitled under the le.r fori to proceed is
grounds for disregarding the rule of private international law in
that one narrow case. For the Stewart case to apply, then, the beneficiaries under both statutes must be the same, and under both, they
must seek redress through a trustee of some sort. No one can possibly be prejudiced, except perhaps the, logicians.
J.F.H.
LIQUOR LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA-RETAIL LICENSE-NECESSTY-In the administration of the Brooks High License Law, which
now -regulates the sale of intoxicating liquors in Pennsylvania, no
subject seems to have been more productive of difference of opinion
and practice than the interpretation of the powers and duties conferred upon the Courts of Quarter Sessions of the various counties
in the granting or refusing of licenses. The pivotal point of difference seems to lie in the question of "necessity", as involved in the
regulatory statute. The statute provides that "the said Court of
Quarter Sessions shall hear petitions " . . in favor of and remonstrances against the application for such license, and in all cases
shall refuse the same whenever, in the opinion of the said court,
having due regard to the number and character of the petitioners
for and against such application, such license is not necessary for the
accommodation of the public and entertainment of strangers and
travelers".' It is clear that the act places the determination of the
question of necessity within the discretion of the Court of Quarter
Sessions and the appellate courts of the State have so held. In the
recent case of Gohn's License2 the order of -the Court of Quarter
Sessions refusing a license on the ground of lack of necessity was
sustained, even though no remonstrances were filed against the application.
The leading case dealing with the question of necessity is that
of Schlaudecker v. Marshall.3 It is true that that case involved the
interpretation of an earlier act than the one now in force; but the
question of necessity was not changed by the later statute now controlling, so the decision of the court in the case mentioned is still
applicable.4 The Supreme Court, speaking through Mfr. Justice
Agnew, said:
'Act of May

13, 1887,

a57 Pa. Super. Ct.

P. L 1o8, §7.

i6o (1914).

a 72 Pa. 200 (i872).

'Cf. Act of March

22, 1867. P. L. 40, §1.
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"The discretion vested in the court is a sound judicial
discretion; and to be a rightful judgment it must be exercised
in the particular facts and circumstances before the court, after
they have been heard and duly considered; in other words, to
be exercised upon the merits of each case."
This interpretation of the powers conferred upon the Court of
Quarter Sessions in granting licenses has been subsequently approved by both the Supreme and Superior Courts of the Commonwealth." It being clear that the question of necessity is for the
sound judicial discretion of the court, there remains the important
question of determining what things shall control or influence such
discretion. The act itself provides one method whereby the court
may seek aid in this problem. It stipulates that the court shall hear
petitions in favor of and remonstrances against the applications for
licenses. These are not conclusive on the court, however.' They
are for the information of the conscience of the court and for the
sole purpose of determining whether the license in question is, or
is not, a matter of public necessity.' It is nbt necessary that the petitioners and remonstrants should be voters; it is enough that they be
citizens, whether male or female.' But such methods of determining the question of necessity are not compulsory on the court. In
exercising its judicial discretion the court may act of its own knowledge and refuse a license, even though there is no remonstrance
a.-ainst it.' But if the court is without knowledge other than by the
petition of the applicant, and there is no remonstrance, it would
seem that the license must be granted.10
There has been considerable diversity of opinion among
the courts of the State as to whether the term necessity refers to the
license itself or to the hotel or eating house in connection with which
the license is sought. But the Superior Court has distinctly said
that not every place that may be necessary as a hotel or eating house
for public accommodation is entitled as matter of right to be licensed
to sell
liquors if the Qther statutory requirements are complied
1

with.

The refusal of a license because of lack of necessity does not
make the question of necessity res judicata upon the hearing of the
'Reed's Appeal, 114 Pa. 452 (xM35); Raudenbusch's Petition, 120 Pa. 328
(iS ) ; Sparrow's Petition, x38 Pa. z6 (189o); Reznor Hotel Companys.

License, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 525 Cr907).
"Sparrow's Petition, supra, note 5.
Re ed's Appeal, supra, note 5.
' Reed's Appeal, .sipra, note _.
' Raudenbusch's Petit.on, supra, note 5; Mitchell's License, 48 Pa. Super.
Ct. 4o6 (grz)); Gohn's License, 57 Super. Ct. x6o (xgi4).
" Kelminski's License, 164 Pa. 231 0894).
11
Reznor Hotel Compmy's License, supra, note 5; Raudenbusch's Petition, supra, note 5.
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application of the same person for the same premises in a subsequent year; but the court may consider it in connection with the
other relevant facts established at the hearing 2or known to the
court, particularly if the conditions be unchanged. 3 The grant of a'
license for the same premises during the previous year or for several
preceding years is a fact more often in evidence, since the great majority of applications are*for renewals. The appellate courts seem
not to have expressly determined the weight to be given to such
evidence. In one case the Superior Court said that "the granting
or refusal of license in previous years is not conclusive, and, under
some circumstances, it ought to have little, if any, weight in the
determination of the application before the court'.2

Among the

Courts of Quarter Sessions there is a diversity of opinion as to the
weight which should be given to the fact that an application is for a
renewal. Some courts have said that the fact that a place has been
heretofore licensed is prima facie evidence of its necessity."' But
the better opinion, in view of the fact that the statute in question is
an act "to restrain and regulate the sale of liquors" would seem to
be that enunciated by Judge Hare, who held that "every renewal is a
new grant and the applicant must make out his case with the same
precision whether he is coming for the first or the twentieth time." 15
When the Court of Quarter Sessiohs has heard or decided an
application its whole duty is performed and it is not required to
give the reasons for its decision."' Being an exercise of its judicial
the court hearing an application will not be
discretion, the finding of
considered on appeal. T Upon appeal the presumption arising from.
a regular record is that the court below refused the license for a
legal, and not for an arbitrary reason ;", and this presumption cannot
be rebutted by an argument from the "evidence that the court ought
o
to have reached a different conclusion.
It seems clear, therefore, that the grant of a license to sell
intoxicating liquors depends primarily upon the question of whether
such license is necessary for the accommodation of the public and
the entertainment of strangers and travelers; that the determination of this question rests exclusively in the sound judicial discretion of the court to whic', application for a license is made; that for
Reznor Hotel Company's License, suPra, note S.
Reznor Hotel Company's License, jupra, note S.
"'It re Rief's License, 2 Leh. V. 400 (j887),, Howell's Application, io
Pa. Dist. Rep. 5o4 (i9or).
'Eick's License, i Pa. C. C. 5o (895).
"Kilgore & Company's License, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 543 (xgoo).
" Reed's Appeal, supra, note 5; Raudenbusch's Petition, supra, note s;
Nolan's License, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 55r (i91i); Mitchell's License, supra,
A
note 9.
-Shearer's License, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 34 ([904); Mitchell's License, 48
Pa. Super. Ct. 4o6 (igr).
'

1

"McCrory's License, 31 Pa. Super. Ct.

192

(iqo6).
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the information of its conscience, the court may hear petitions for
and remonstrances against the granting of a particular license, but
not necessarily, as it may act of its own knowledge; that the term
"necessity" refers to the license to sell liquors, and, by the better view
is to be considered in each case'de novo, whether the.application be
for a new license or for a renewal; that since the act is an act "to
restrain and regulate" the sale of liquors and directs the court to
"refuse" the license when it is not necessary, the burden is on the
applicant to establish sucti necessity to the satisfaction of the judicial
discretion of the court.
R.M.G.
NEGLIGENcE-LIABILITY

OF WATER COMPANIES

IN

CASE OF

is a general rule of wide application that a municipality is
not liable for property destroyed by fire on account of its failure to
furnish an adequate supply of water." When a municipal corporation undertakes to furnish water to be used as a protection against
fire, it acts in a governmental capacity, and is no more responsible
for failure in that respect than it would be for failure to furnish
adequate police service.2 But a problem of much difficulty arises in
relation to hydrant supply to a city for extinguishment of fires when
there is a contract between the water-works and the municipality in
which it is provided that a certain pressure shall be maintained. In
a late case in the Supreme Court of Canada,8 there was a suit by a
householder in a municipality against the water company supplying
the district, seeking to recover damages in his own right for the
failure to supply sufficient water to extinguish the fire which destroyed his premises. By its contract with the municipality the
water company undertook to maintain a defined water pressure for
fire purposes. The court held that no right of action arose out of
such a contract in favor of the taxpayer.
The great majority of American courts hold that the taxpayer
has no direct interest in such agreements and, therefore, cannot sue
in contract.4 Neither can he sue in tort, because in the absence of a
contract obligation to him, the water company owes him no duty for
the breach of which he can maintain an action.5 But in Kentucky,
North Carolina and Florida the courts have reached a different conFIRE-It

(1877); Wendel v. City of Wheel1 Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311
ing, 28 W. Va. 233 (I886).
2 Gennan Alliance Insurance Company v. Home Water Company, 226
U. S. 220 (1912).

'Pelanger v. Montreal Water & Power Co., 5o Can. Sup. Ct. 356 (1914).
'Wainwright v. Queen County Water Co., 78 Hun, 146 (N. Y. 1894);
House v. Houston Water Works Co., 88 Tex. 233 (1895); Thompson v.
Springfield Water Company, 215 Pa. 275 (1906).
'Nicherson v. Pridgeport Hydr:.xmlic CO, 46 Conn. 24 (1878); Fitch v.
Seymour Water Vorks, 130 Ind. 214 (1894).
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clusiov. They hold that such a contract is for the benefit of the taxpayers, who may sue either for its breach or for a violation of the
public duty which was thereby assumed.$ The argument for thd
citizen is briefly put in a North Carolina case:? "There can be no
real contention that the plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer, and one of
the beneficiaries in the purview of this contract cannot prosecute
this action. He is the real party in interest. He is taxed with payment of his pro rata of the annual rent. The town cannot maintain
this action for the loss sustained by him by reason of the defendant's
failure to perform the provisions of the contract. For this injury
the plaintiff alone can sue. The same principle has been often
affirmed, to wit, that the beneficiary of a contract, though not a
party to it, nor expressly named therein, can maintain an action for
a breach of such contract causing injury to him, if the contract was
made for his benefit." One of the most forcible arguments to the
contrary is contained in a leading Texas case:' "It is not true, that
for every failure to perform a public duty an action will lie in favor
of any person who may suffer injury by reason of such failure. If
the duty is purely a public duty, then the individual will have no
right of action; but it must appear that the object and purpose of irposing the duty was to confer a benefit upon the individuals composing the public."
By far the most usual line of reasoning upon which the water
company is held not liable, is that the citizen is not in any proper
sense the beneficiary of the obligation on the part of the water company to the municipality.' It has been attempted in several cases to
base the action against the water company on the theory of tort, so
as to avoid the difficulties incident to an action on the contract. But
this theory has received little support from the courts.1 0 It is to be
noted, however, that the tort theory has been adopted by three
States.
A dictum in Guardian Trust Company v. Fisher,2 in the
Supreme.Court of the United States is to the effect that an action
of tort lies against the water company, but.a later case clearly shows
the present position of. the court to be to the contrary.2
Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 34o (1889);
Correll v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328 (i899); Muggee v.
Tampa Water Works Co., 52 Fla. 371 (i9o6).
'Jones v. Durham Water Co., 135 N. C. 553 (9o4).
'House v. Houston Water Works Co., 88 Tex. 273 (i8g5).
'Ukiah City v. Ukiah Water & Imp. Co., x42 Cal. 173 (rpo4); Allen &
Curry Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Water Co, 113 La. 1o9I (19o5).

"Fowler v. Water Vorks Co., 83 Ga. 219 (1889); Fitch v. Seymour
Water Co, x39 Ind. 2r4 (1894).
"Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co.. 128 N. C. 375 (19ox) ; Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Graves County Water Co., I2O Ky. 40 (io5); Muggee
v. Tampa Water Works Co., 52 Fla. 371 (19o6).
a
Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S. 57 (x9o5).
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Co., supra, note 2.
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. Some few cases seem to maintain that the citizens should be
regarded as the sole beneficiaries of the contract,14 but the difficulty
of that view is that the performance was promised the municipality
and was not by the terms of the contract to be made to citizens individually. It would seem that when the greatest latitude is allowed
a person who is not a party to a contract to sue upon it as a beneficiary, there is still the condition that the plaintiff must be a direct
beneficiary as distinguished from one who is merely collaterally or
incidentally benefited.15 If the performance by the water company
in furnishing water for fire protection runs directly and physically
to the iihabitant, then the water company may be liable both in contract and tort. On the other hand, if the performance runs directly
and physically to the municipality alone, then the inhabitant is only
incidentally and collaterally benefited and there should be no recovery in either contradt or in tort. It is submitted that the latter view
is the only sound one, under the facts of the principal case. While.
it is true that the water company is a public service corporation
which inight in fact enter the public calling of furnishing water for
fire protection to the inhabitants directly, for use by the inhabitants
in person, yet it has not in fact done so when it merely undertakes
to furnish the city with water as a part of the equipment of the
municipal fire department. The result may seem very violent when
tle inhdbitant is not allowed to sue, but it would seemn that the only
way in which a default to the citizen could be worked out would be
to show that the obligation created really runs to the citizens individually; but it is more obviously made to the municipality as an
entity.

G.W. K.

WATERS-RIGHT TO PROTECT AGAINST FLOOD VATERS-URBAN"

RTY-An interesting question arose in the recent case of
Smcltzer v. The Borough of Ford Citf as to the right of a property
owner-in this case a municipality-to build a dike or embankment
on his land to prevent the flood waters from a nearby stream from
flowing over it. In the case mentioned the dike sought to be enjoined was not upon the banks of the stream, nor even upon the
land of a riparian owner, but was located some three hundred feet
back from the channel, and was within the borough limits of the defendant. The plaintiff's lot was across the stream and outside the
borough limits. The effect of the embankment was to cause the
flood waters to overflow the plaintiff's land during flood times to a
PRo

"4 Terrell v. Louisville Water Co., 127 Ky. 77 (19o7); Jones v. Durham
Water Company, supra, note 7.
National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. x23 (x878) ; Crandell v. Payne,
4
627
AtI. 0829s).
292 Atl. Rep. 702 (Pa. t914).
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depth four feet greater than had previously been the case at like periods. The court decided that the defendant was within its rights in
so warding off the flood waters and that an injunction would not lie.
The solution of the question involved would seem to be found in
determining the nature of flood waters-whether they are to be
treated as surface waters and so subject to the rules applicable to
such waters, or whether they are still to be regarded as part of the
main stream from whose. banks they have temporarily escaped.
While the rights of property owners relative to surface waters is
fairly well settled in most jurisdictions, and the same is true of the
rights of riparian owners to deal with the waters of a stream, the
question involved in the principal case, namely, the rights of others
than riparian owners to deal with flood waters a considerable distance from the main channel of a stream, seems to have been rarely
adjudicated.
As to surface waters there are two distinct rules, generally
designated as the civil law rule and the common law rule. By the former rule, which would seem to prevail in the majority of jurisdictions, the lower and servient tenement must receive the waters which
flow naturally from the dominant estate.2 By the rule of the common
law, however, there is no servitude on the lower tenement and the
owner thereof may do as he pleases with his property regardless of
the effect upon surface waters.3 Under, this rule no legal right of
any kind can be claimed jure naturae in the flow of surface water,
so that neither its detention, diversion or repulsion is an actionable
injury, even though damage ensue.'
As to the rights of a riparian owner to deal with the waters of a
stream it is undoubtedly the general rule that he cannot restrain a
stream from overflowing its banks in such a way as to cause superabundant water, in times of flood, to flow upon or injure the lands
of adjacent riparian owners.5 This principle has been recognized
and approved by the Pennsylvania courts.'
'Herbert v. Hudson, 13 La. 54 (1838); Cranson v. Snyder, 137 Midh.
ioo N. W. Rep. 674 (19o4); Pinkstaff v. Steffy, 216 IlL 406, 75 N. F_.
Rep. 163 (igo5); Pohlman v. Ry. Co., r3i Ia. 89, 107 N. W. Rep. xo25 (1906).
See also Gray y. McWilliams, 21 L R. A. 593 (x893) and note.
'Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kans. 214 (i88r); Walker v. R. Co., 16S U. S.
593 (1897); Cox v. R. Co., 174 Mo. 588, 74 S. W. Rep. 854 (1903); Parks
v. Newburyport, 76 Mass. 28 (857); Dickinson y. Worcester, 7 Allen, i9
(Mass. 1863); Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. I.1- 351 (x865). Cf. note, 21 L R.
340,

A. 593 (1893).

' Bowlsby v. Speer, supra, note 3.
'Ferris v. Dudley, 78 Ala. 124 (884); Burke v. Sanitary Dist., r52 IlL
125, 38 N. E. Rep. 670 (1894); Keck v. Vengbause, x27 Ia. 529, 1o3 N. W.
Rep. 773 (igos) ; Parker v. Atchison, 58 Kans. 29, 48 Pac. Rep. 631 (1897);
Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 279, 7 N. F_. Rep. 429 (1886).
'Hays v. Hinkleman, 68 Pa. -- 4 (187); Brown v. Ry. Cci., 183 Pa. 38
(897); Taylor v. Canton Twp., 3o Pa. Super. Ct. 3o5 (1go6).
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With regard to surface waters the Pennsylvania courts have
drawn a clear distinction between cases arising in towns and cities
and those arising in the country districts. In the latter case the rule
of the civil law is followed.7 But where the question arises in the
improvement of a town or city lot or municipal change of grade it is
equally as clear that the common law rule wilibe applied.'
The situation in the principal case was a complicated one to
which no single one of the above principles would apply. The defendant, so far as the report of the case shows, was not a riparian
owner, the dike in question being some three hundred feet from the
bank of the stream, and there being an intervening proprietor; the
waters sought to be warded off were not ordinary surface waters,
but flood waters from the nearby stream; the relative situation of
the lands of the plaintiff and defendant respectively was not such
as to make the rules as to surface waters applicable; finally, the defendant was a municipality, the dike was within the borough limits,
while the land of the plaintiff was not.
. By the weight of authority where a stream is stibject to periodic
overflow, the flood waters at such times are not to be considered as
surface waters, but as part of the natural watercourse.9 It would
seem, therefore, that in dealing with such waters the ordinary rules
applicable to riparian owners would apply. Considering the principal decision from that viewpoint its holding is contrary to the general
rules as to riparian rights. We have seen, on the other hand, that in
Pennsylvania the common law rule as to surface waters prevails in
the grading or alteration of town or city lots and streets. 10 And
this holds true in the case of a municipal improvement as well as to
an alteration by an individual lot owner. 1
It would seem by
analogy to this rule that the court in the Ford City case reached its
decision, although it does not expressly say so. While treating the
case de 'oz'o and without citation of authority the court says "it
would be unreasonable to prevent the owners of low lands from
elevating their property for the purpose of protecting it from injury
and damage from floods. . . . Between the method of raising the
level of individual lots and the building of a dike which will protect
the entire area concerned we can see no essential difference in principle." The court further said that there was no servitude on lands
T
Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 4o7 (i856); Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa.
154 (1864); Hays v. Hinkleman, supra, note 6; Rhoads v. Davidson, 133 Pa.
226 (89o).
'Straus v. Allentown. 2=5 Pa. 96 (ico6); Reilly v. Stephenson, 2 Pa.
252 (9o8); Wilqon v. McCluskey, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1911); Robino
v. No. Sewickley Twp., 48 Pa. Super. Ct. 68 (ipis).
*Jones v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 67 S. C. 181 (19o3); Ry. Co. v.
Hamlet Hay Co., 149 Ind. 344 (1897) ; Crawford v. Rambo, supra, note 5.
3 Supra, note 8.
' Straus v. Allentown, supra, note 8; Robino v. No. Sewickley Twp.,
supra, note &
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near a stream to other adjoining lands lying upstream, but equally
as low, or lower, to carry off, without interference, flood waters, and
that "such an overflow is properly to be regarded as the advance of a
common enemy, to be resisted by each proprietor as best he may".
Whatever the basis of 'the decision, it establishes the right of other
than riprarian owners to deal with flood waters in towns and cities.
From the viewpoint of public policy the decision is unquestionably a
sound one, for, as the court says, to hold otherwise would be to prevent the inhabitants of loWer lands in a town or city from protecting
themselves and their property from overflow; and such persons
would be obliged to permit their property to remain on the natural
surface, subject to periodic overflow and inundation, without power
to protect it or raise it out of reach of flood waters. It is interesting to speculate, however, what the court would have done had the
case arisen entirely in a country district.
R. M. G.

